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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
A group of former customers (collectively, 
“Appellants” or “the named plaintiffs”) of Synapse Group 
Inc. (“Synapse”) successfully petitioned under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(f)1 for interlocutory review of an order 
denying class certification.  More specifically, Appellants 
challenge the decision of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey to deny certification of a Rule 
23(b)(2) injunctive relief class consisting of Synapse 
customers who received automatic renewal notifications in 
connection with magazine subscriptions obtained through 
Synapse.  Because we conclude that Appellants, none of 
whom are current Synapse customers, lack standing to seek 
the remedy they are pursuing on behalf of the class, we will 
affirm the District Court’s order denying class certification.2
                                              
1 That rule provides that “[a] court of appeals may 
permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-
action certification … if a petition for permission to appeal is 
filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is 
entered.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  We will hereafter refer to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply as “Rules.” 
 
2 Appellants have moved to file Volume IV of the 
appendix and their reply brief under seal because some of the 
materials therein were produced under a confidentiality order 
and filed under seal in the District Court.  Appellants, 
however, have failed to limit the scope of their request by 
asking us to seal only those materials that are actually the 
subject of the confidentiality order, and we will therefore 
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I. Background 
 
A. Synapse’s Magazine Sales 
 
Synapse, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time Inc. 
(“Time”), is the largest marketer of magazine subscriptions in 
the United States.  It conducts its business operations under 
several other names, including Magazine Direct, New Sub 
Magazine Services, SynapseConnect, Synapse Solutions, and 
CAP Systems.  Aiming to “bring magazine publishers and 
potential subscribers together by promoting trial offers that 
might evolve into long-term subscriptions,” Synapse markets 
over 800 magazines to consumers through “credit card 
issuers, catalogers, retailers, airlines, and internet companies.”  
(App. at 643.)   
                                                                                                     
deny their request, without prejudice to their submitting an 
appropriately limited motion.  See L.A.R. 30.3(b) (2008) 
(“Records sealed in the district court … must … not be 
included in the paper appendix.”); see also Couch v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Mem’l Hosp. of Carbon Cnty., 587 F.3d 1223, 1245 
n.25 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying “the parties’ motions to seal 
both the record on appeal and their briefs” because “[t]he 
court’s business is public business”); Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Disturbingly, 
some courts routinely sign orders which contain 
confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of 
such orders, or the countervailing public interests which are 
sacrificed by the orders.”).  To the extent we have not already 
relied on the materials filed under seal in setting forth the 
facts of this case, we will delay the effective date of this 
denial for two weeks, to allow Appellants an opportunity to 
prepare a properly redacted filing. 
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The majority of Synapse’s magazine subscriptions are 
offered under what is known as a “continuous service plan” 
whereby a customer’s subscription does not expire unless and 
until the customer opts to cancel it.  To secure subscribers to 
those plans, Synapse offers introductory promotional offers 
under which customers can receive magazine subscriptions 
for free or at greatly reduced rates.  Although the offers are 
varied, all customers provide a credit or debit card number 
upon signing up and are informed that, once the promotional 
rate expires, their card will be charged at the regular 
subscription rate, unless the subscription is cancelled.   
 
1. Synapse’s Advance Notification of  
  Future Charges 
 
Prior to processing charges for the promised rate 
increase, however, Synapse provides its customers with 
advance notice.  That notice, made in accordance with the 
terms of Synapse’s initial offer, explains the impending 
charge for continued services and provides a toll-free 
telephone number for the customer to call to cancel his or her 
magazine subscriptions.  Before 2009, Synapse provided the 
majority of those notifications by sending its customers a 
sealed double postcard with a visible exterior and a concealed 
interior (the “Standard Postcard”).  The front of the Standard 
Postcard’s exterior was addressed to the customer and 
contained no other text besides a return address.  The back of 
the Standard Postcard’s exterior appeared as follows: 
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(App. at 507.)  The Standard Postcard’s interior, which, 
again, was only visible if opened, stated the names of the 
magazines subscribed to, the number of issues ordered, the 
cost of the automatic renewal, and a toll-free number for 
customers to call to cancel their magazine subscriptions, if 
they so desired.   
 
Synapse’s market testing demonstrated that an explicit 
statement on the exterior of the Standard Postcard that it was 
an “automatic renewal notice” or an “automatic magazine 
renewal” would increase the number of pre-billing 
cancellations.  For example, adding the words “Your 
Automatic Magazine Renewal Notice” to the front of the 
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Standard Postcard’s exterior resulted in an increase of several 
percentage points in pre-billing cancellations.  An expert 
retained by Appellants took that into account in opining that 
the Standard Postcard was “intentionally designed to avoid 
giving customers notice of renewal.”  (App. at 1098.) 
 
 Beginning in February 2009, Synapse voluntarily 
began using a new, non-folded, postcard to provide its 
advance notifications to customers (the “Single Postcard”).  
Unlike the Standard Postcard, the Single Postcard contains no 
interior.  The back of the Single Postcard has a picture of 
magazines in a mailbox and states that magazine 
subscriptions are available for up to 40% off newsstand 
prices.  The front of the Single Postcard contains two panels.  
On the left side, it states in large print: “The low rate for your 
next year of issues is guaranteed!”  (App. at 1483.)  And then, 
in smaller print, it says: 
 
We guarantee a hassle-free subscription.  
You’ll never miss an issue.  No bills, reminders, 
publisher renewal notices and no telemarketing 
calls.  We do the work for you by automatically 
extending your subscription each year for as 
long as you want your selections. 
 
Your service includes convenient home 
delivery and huge savings off the 
newsstand price. 
 
We guarantee to send you advance notice 
every year about your next subscription 
period and rates.  We will send you notice that 
spells out:  your guaranteed low rate, your 
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number of issues and when your credit card will 
be charged.  If you don’t wish to continue, you 
can simply cancel before your new term begins. 
 
We guarantee you outstanding savings.  As a 
Valued Subscriber, enjoy substantial savings off 
cover price.  For more great deals, visit 
www.magazineoutlet.com. 
(Id.)  On the right side, the following appears: 
Thank you for being a valued customer.  We 
hope you have been enjoying your service, as 
your complete satisfaction is our ultimate goal. 
 
For your convenience, we will continue to 
ensure that you don’t receive extra unwanted 
mail – the multiple renewal notices and bills 
that normally come with a subscription.  For the 
next term of issues the credit card you 
previously provided for your selections and will 
be charged for [magazine title], at $[price] … .  
If you do not wish to continue, call 800 927 
9351 by [date] and no charge will appear.  As 
long as you are satisfied, your selections will 
continue through our open-ended, customer-
friendly subscription method – continuous 
service.  Of course, we will always send you a 
courtesy reminder before you are ever billed to 
ensure your satisfaction.  Remember, you can 
always look for the expiration date on your 
magazine label.  You may cancel anytime and 
receive a refund of unserved issues.  If a title 
ceases, it will be replaced with one of equal or 
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greater value.  We hope you enjoy your 
selections and look forward to serving you in 
the future.  Please keep this notice for your 
records. 
(Id.)   
 
Appellants’ expert reviewed Synapse’s Single Postcard 
and concluded that it, like the Standard Postcard, is “an 
exercise in deception” inasmuch as it provides scant 
information and is designed to appear like a direct mail offer 
for a new subscription rather than an automatic renewal 
notice for an existing subscription.3
                                              
3 Appellants believe that Synapse’s use of the Standard 
Postcard and Single Postcard violates accepted standards in 
the publishing industry, as evidenced by an agreement 
between Synapse’s parent company, Time, and 23 states’ 
Attorneys General.  That agreement, known as the Assurance 
of Voluntary Compliance or Discontinuance (the 
“Assurance”), provides that Time and its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries must send continuous-service-plan customers 
advance notification reminders that clearly and conspicuously 
identify the relevant terms concerning automatic renewals.  
Although Appellants acknowledge that Synapse is not bound 
by the Assurance because it did not become a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Time until after the Assurance was signed, they 
contend that the Assurance demonstrates that there are 
governing industry standards which Synapse is knowingly 
violating by using deceptive advance notification reminder 
mailings.   
  (App. at 1495.) 
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2. Synapse’s Cancellation Process 
 
As detailed above, while the effectiveness of the 
message may be open to dispute, both the Standard Postcard 
and the Single Postcard state that a customer will be 
automatically charged a renewal rate if the customer does not 
cancel his subscription before a certain date.  If a customer’s 
subscription is not timely cancelled, however, the customer 
can still seek a complete or pro rata refund.  There are at least 
two ways to reach Synapse to request cancellation or seek 
reimbursement of an unwanted automatic renewal charge.  
The customer may either call the number listed on the 
advance notification mailing, or he may call a toll-free 
number that is automatically listed on his credit or debit card 
statement when a charge is submitted by Synapse.   
 
While the toll-free number that appears on a 
customer’s billing statement differs from the phone number 
that appears on Synapse’s advance renewal notices, both lead 
customers to Synapse’s Interactive Voice Recognition 
(“IVR”) telephone system.  That system is meant to be 
entirely automated, so that a caller will not ordinarily interact 
with a human being, but the IVR usually does permit 
customers to reach a live operator by pressing zero or failing 
to respond to the IVR’s prompts.  When a customer attempts 
to cancel his magazine subscriptions using the IVR system, 
the IVR attempts to retain that business by presenting so-
called “save offers.”  On average, approximately 30% of 
callers accept a save offer.  The remaining 70% of Synapse 
customers who call to cancel end up doing so, and most are, 
in fact, able to accomplish that without speaking with a live 
operator.   
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B. Procedural History 
 
Appellants, who are “residents”4 of New Jersey, New 
York, or the District of Columbia, received the Standard 
Postcard when they were Synapse customers and brought suit 
against Synapse after allegedly suffering monetary injury as a 
result of Synapse’s deceptive business practices.5
                                              
4 In their second amended complaint, the operative 
pleading in this case, Appellants refer to themselves as 
“residents” of their respective states, not as “citizens” or 
“domiciliaries” of those states.  (See, e.g., App. at 293 
(“McNair is a resident of … New Jersey … having a place of 
residence in … New Jersey.”).)  Although those averments 
need not, and do not, serve as a basis for our disposition, they 
are jurisdictionally inadequate in this diversity of citizenship 
case.  See Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 
1972) (“[M]ere residency in a state is insufficient for 
purposes of diversity [of citizenship].”).  So too is Appellants’ 
allegation of Synapse’s citizenship, which, instead of 
identifying Synapse’s principal place of business and state of 
incorporation, refers only to “a” principal place of business.  
(App. at 294); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] corporation 
shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State … by which it 
has been incorporated and of the State … where it has its 
principal place of business … .”); J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. 
Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1265 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (alleging that a corporation has “‘a’ principal place 
of business” in a given state is insufficient to establish 
domicile so as to “properly plead diversity jurisdiction”).  
This lack of care in invoking the District Court’s jurisdiction 
is regrettable. 
 
5 Appellants do not allege that they received Synapse’s 
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1. Appellants’ Initial Motion for Class  
  Certification 
 
On June 29, 2009, Appellants moved for class 
certification based on a prior iteration of their complaint, 
which pleaded consumer fraud claims for monetary and 
injunctive relief under New Jersey, New York, and District of 
Columbia law.  McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc., No. 06-cv-5072, 
2009 WL 1873582, at *8, *12 (D.N.J. June 29, 2009).  
Specifically, Appellants asked the District Court to certify the 
following class under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3):    
 
From October 23, 2000 to the date of the order 
certifying the class, all persons residing in New 
Jersey, New York and the District of Columbia 
who accepted an initial magazine subscription, 
or subscriptions, offered by Synapse, were sent 
[the Standard Postcard] notification with the 
“standard exterior” in advance of an automatic 
charge for an additional term or renewal of their 
subscription(s), and either before or after being 
charged for the additional term or renewal of 
their subscription(s): 
 
(1) called the Synapse “IVR,” and responded 
affirmatively to the recorded question asking 
whether they were calling to cancel a magazine 
or selected an option to cancel a magazine from 
the list of options presented, and rejected all 
“save attempts” that may have been offered; or, 
 
                                                                                                     
new Single Postcard. 
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(2) fully cancelled the subscription(s) by 
speaking with a Synapse live operator; and, 
were not refunded all charges for the additional 
term or renewal of the magazine subscription(s) 
and/or were not reimbursed upon request to 
Synapse all bank overdraft charges, on their 
debit or credit card(s).  Excluded from the class 
are defendant, its agents and affiliates, and any 
government entities. 
 
Id. at *6 (quoting Appellants’ Reply Mem. of Law in Support 
of Class Cert.). 
 
The District Court denied the motion.  Observing that 
Appellants’ various consumer fraud claims required a causal 
link between the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and the 
defendant’s alleged deception, the District Court concluded 
that predominance was lacking because it could not be 
presumed that all of the class members were deceived by 
Synapse’s marketing techniques.  Id. at *12.  In fact, the 
Court noted that two of the five named plaintiffs were not 
deceived by the Standard Postcard, as they “read … and acted 
on it.”  Id.  Accordingly, as the District Court held, a Rule 
23(b)(3) damages class could not be certified.  The District 
Court also rejected Appellants’ request for certification as an 
injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2), reasoning that “the 
predominant relief sought … [was] money damages,” and 
“certification under Rule 23(b)(2) [was therefore] not 
appropriate.”  Id. at *7.  The Court stated, however, that “[a] 
differently defined class or one that does not predominantly 
seek money damages may pass muster.”  Id. at *14. 
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2. Appellants’ Motion to File an Amended  
  Complaint 
 
Appellants did not challenge the District Court’s 
decision denying their initial motion for class certification.  
Instead, on August 10, 2009, they filed a motion proposing a 
revised complaint that sought injunctive relief only.  See 
McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc., No. 06-cv-5072, 2009 WL 
3754183, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2009).  Synapse opposed the 
new complaint on several grounds, arguing that, under Article 
III of the United States Constitution, Appellants lacked 
standing because they were no longer Synapse customers and 
therefore could not claim a likelihood of future injury.  See id. 
at *3 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 
(1983)).  Synapse also argued that Appellants lacked statutory 
standing under New Jersey law because their amended 
complaint abandoned all claims for monetary relief.6
 
  See id. 
at *4-5 (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 801 A.2d 281, 291 
(N.J. 2002), for the proposition that Appellants lacked 
statutory standing because Appellants failed to plead “any 
claim for ascertainable, money, loss”).   
Appellants responded that they have Article III 
standing to seek injunctive relief because they are likely to be 
                                              
6 Synapse did not lodge a similar argument with 
respect to Appellants’ claims under New York and District of 
Columbia law.  They did, however, argue that Appellants’ 
requested amendment would, as a whole, be futile because the 
proposed class failed to meet the standards necessary for 
certification.  The District Court rejected that contention, 
reasoning that “any ruling on whether class certification is 
warranted is premature.”  Synapse, 2009 WL 3754183, at *5. 
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Synapse customers in the future.  The District Court agreed 
with that theory.  Although it acknowledged that none of the 
named plaintiffs claimed to be current Synapse customers, the 
Court decided that they had made a “sufficient showing that 
they are likely to become Synapse customers in the future” 
because Synapse is the leading marketer of magazine 
subscriptions and offers compelling magazine deals in which 
it does not clearly identify itself as the distributor.  Id. at *4.  
The District Court further concluded that the named plaintiffs 
were likely to suffer from the alleged deception again because 
“the whole point of” the advance notification renewal 
postcards is to fool consumers into discarding it.  Id.  
However, because Appellants’ complaint had abandoned 
claims for monetary relief, the District Court agreed with 
Synapse that Appellants lacked statutory standing to seek 
injunctive relief under New Jersey law.  Id. at *5. 
 
3. Appellants’ Second Amended Complaint 
and Motion for Class Certification 
Appellants filed a timely motion for reconsideration on 
November 17, 2009, apprising the Court that they had, in fact, 
intended to seek monetary relief in their amended complaint – 
albeit only on behalf of themselves individually – and that 
they therefore had statutory standing to seek injunctive relief 
under New Jersey law.  The District Court, over Synapse’s 
objection, entered an order permitting Appellants to again 
amend their complaint for the purpose of clarifying their 
assertion of individual claims for monetary relief.  Appellants 
did so on December 31, 2009, filing a second amended 
complaint (the “Complaint”),7
                                              
7 Appellants second amended complaint is actually the 
 which is the operative pleading 
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before us on this appeal and which asserts three separate 
consumer fraud claims under New Jersey, New York, and 
District of Columbia law.  It seeks both monetary and 
injunctive relief for the individual Appellants but only 
injunctive relief for class members.     
 
On June 18, 2010, Appellants moved for class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2), asking the District Court to 
certify the following class: 
 
All persons residing in New Jersey from 
October 23, 2000 to the date of the order 
certifying the class, and all persons residing in 
New York and the District of Columbia from 
                                                                                                     
fifth iteration of Appellants’ pleading filed on the District 
Court’s docket over the course of this litigation.  The first 
complaint, filed on October 23, 2006, named only Charles 
McNair as a plaintiff.  The second, filed on August 2, 2007, 
added Theodore Austin, Danielle Demetriou, Steven Novak, 
Rod Bare, Ushma Desai, and Julie Dynko as named plaintiffs.  
The third, submitted for the District Court’s review by way of 
Appellants’ August 10, 2009 motion to file an amended 
complaint, dropped Bare and Novak as plaintiffs.  The fourth, 
submitted by way of Appellants’ November 17, 2009 motion 
for reconsideration, added requests for monetary relief on 
behalf of the named plaintiffs remaining in Appellants’ third 
complaint.  The fifth and final complaint was filed on 
December 31, 2009, after the District Court granted 
Appellants’ November 17 motion to reconsider and afforded 
them an opportunity to prepare another version of the 
complaint.   
17 
 
October 23, 2003 to the date of the order 
certifying the class, who as customers of 
Synapse were mailed a postcard advance 
notification of an automatic charge for an 
additional term or renewal of their magazine 
subscription(s) that failed to state that he or she 
is an Automatic Renewal Customer or is subject 
to an automatic charge, in type larger and more 
prominent than the predominant type in the 
notice.  Excluded from the class are defendant, 
its agents and affiliates, and any government 
entities. 
(App. at 485.)  Appellants also sought to certify two 
subclasses: 
All members of the Class who were sent 
Defendant’s [Standard Postcard] as the advance 
notification of an automatic charge for an 
additional term or renewal of their 
subscription(s). 
… . 
Members of the Class for whom the postcard 
and/or billing descriptor on their credit card or 
bank statement provided a telephone number to 
an IVR that did not audibly state how to transfer 
to a live operator. 
(Id.)   
 
The District Court denied Appellants’ motion on 
November 15, 2010, holding that the putative class lacked the 
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requisite cohesion for purposes of Rule 23(b)(2).  See McNair 
v. Synapse Grp., Inc., No. 06-cv-5072, 2010 WL 4777483, at 
*7-8 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2010).  According to the Court, 
certification was inappropriate because the injunctive relief 
sought would not “benefit the entire class” since Synapse’s 
conduct did not affect all class members in a similar way.  Id. 
at *7; see id. at *6 (“Plaintiff McNair testified that he read the 
card and understood it … .  For class members like Mr. 
McNair, the relief requested would have no benefit.”). 
 
Appellants were granted interlocutory appellate review 
pursuant to Rule 23(f), and this appeal followed.8
                                              
8 Before seeking interlocutory appellate review, 
Appellants asked the District Court to reconsider its order 
denying class certification.  The District Court denied that 
motion.  McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc., No. 06-cv-5072, 2011 
WL 666036 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2011).  Appellants thereafter 
filed their Rule 23(f) petition, which was timely as measured 
from the order denying reconsideration, but untimely as 
measured from the order denying class certification.  We 
granted Appellants’ petition, concluding – as our sister 
circuits have – that the period for filing a Rule 23(f) petition 
“does not start to run until the district judge rules on [a 
timely] motion for reconsideration” of a class certification 
order.  Shin v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 1061, 1064-
65 (11th Cir. 2001); see Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 
181 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, although 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) does not toll the 
time to appeal an interlocutory order, a timely-filed motion 
for reconsideration of a class certification order nevertheless 
“defers the time for appeal until after the district judge has 
disposed of the motion”). 
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II. Discussion9
 
 
As it did before the District Court, Synapse argues that 
Appellants lack Article III standing to pursue injunctive 
relief.  If Synapse is correct, Appellants are not entitled to 
represent the putative Rule 23(b)(2) class they asked the 
District Court to certify.  See, e.g., Prado-Steiman ex rel. 
Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It 
should be obvious that there cannot be adequate typicality 
between a class and a named representative unless the named 
representative has individual standing to raise the legal claims 
                                              
9 The District Court had jurisdiction, if at all, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), which permits district courts to 
exercise “original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class 
action in which … any member of a class of plaintiffs is a 
citizen of a State different from any defendant.”  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 
23(f), and review the District Court’s order denying 
certification for an abuse of discretion.  Behrend v. Comcast 
Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 2011).  Our review is 
plenary, however, to the extent a threshold question of law, 
such as Article III standing, bears on our review of that order.  
See Gen. Instrument Corp. of Del. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., 
Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We exercise plenary 
review of standing … .); see also Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
484 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a certification 
order under Rule 23(f), and observing that the standing 
inquiry “is a question of law that [is] review[ed] de novo”). 
20 
 
of the class.”).  We thus consider whether Appellants have 
standing to seek injunctive relief for the class.10
 
    
In order to have Article III standing to sue, a plaintiff 
bears the burden of establishing “(1) [an] injury-in-fact … 
that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of; and (3) [a likelihood] … that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005); see N.J. 
                                              
10 Although the scope of our Rule 23(f) appellate 
review is limited, see McKowan Lowe & Co., Ltd. v. Jasmine, 
Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing that “Rule 
23(f) inquiries” are limited “to class certification issues”), we 
join our sister circuits in considering Article III standing as a 
necessary threshold issue to our review of an order denying 
class certification.  See Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 
F.3d 416, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that constitutional 
standing may be considered in an appeal under Rule 23(f)); 
Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite 
to class certification and is therefore properly raised in this 
Rule 23(f) appeal.”); City of Hialeah, Fla. v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 
1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] determination on standing 
is a part of the class certification analysis, and thus, subject to 
review under Rule 23(f).” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots, 242 
F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Standing is an inherent 
prerequisite to the class certification inquiry; thus, despite the 
limited nature of a Rule 23(f) appeal, defendants can raise the 
issue of standing … .”). 
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Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing because 
the plaintiffs failed to meet “their burden in pleading facts 
that establish the requisite injury in fact and therefore fail[ed] 
to demonstrate standing”).  When, as in this case, prospective 
relief is sought, the plaintiff must show that he is “likely to 
suffer future injury” from the defendant’s conduct.  Lyons, 
461 U.S. at 105.  In the class action context, that requirement 
must be satisfied by at least one named plaintiff.  See Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege 
and show that they personally have been injured, not that 
injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of 
the class to which they belong and which they purport to 
represent.”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) 
(“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a 
class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with 
the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or 
any other member of the class.”); see also Ellis v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Standing exists if at least one named plaintiff meets the 
requirements.”).  The threat of injury must be “sufficiently 
real and immediate,” Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 
864 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted), and, as a result of the immediacy requirement, 
“[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief … if 
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects,” 
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96; see Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (“To seek injunctive relief, a 
plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury 
in fact’ … .” (emphasis added)); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 
(“Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended 
on whether he was likely to suffer future injury … .”). 
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Pointing to the fact that Appellants are no longer 
customers, Synapse argues that they have no cognizable 
interest in the prospective relief sought in the Complaint.  
Appellants, in response, press the same arguments for 
standing that they made to the District Court, namely, that 
they are subject to a sufficiently real and immediate threat of 
future harm because Synapse is the leading marketer of 
magazine subscriptions and bombards the public with its 
offers; because it offers compelling deals in which it does not 
clearly identify itself; and because it sends customers advance 
notifications that are, by design, meant to fool consumers into 
discarding the notification received.  Appellants further 
respond that they have accepted magazine offers from 
Synapse on more than one occasion.  The District Court 
accepted those arguments and also seemed to agree with 
Appellants that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” 
doctrine applies,11
                                              
11 Although federal courts generally “lack jurisdiction 
when ‘the issues presented are no longer live or the parties 
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,’” Merle v. 
United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted), the “capable of repetition 
yet evading review” doctrine permits consideration of a case 
that “would otherwise be deemed moot” when “‘(1) the 
challenged action is, in its duration, too short to be fully 
litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 
be subject to the same action again,’” id. (quoting Spencer v. 
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).   
 because holding otherwise would unfairly 
“require [Appellants] to allow themselves to be continually 
billed for unwanted renewals either before or during the 
course of the litigation merely for standing purposes.”  
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Synapse, 2009 WL 3754183, at *4 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We disagree, and conclude that Appellants have not 
met their burden of establishing that they have standing to 
seek injunctive relief.  
 
Appellants have effectively acknowledged that they, 
unlike the class members they seek to represent, are not 
Synapse customers and are thus not currently subject to 
Synapse’s allegedly deceptive techniques for obtaining 
subscription renewals.12
                                              
12 Although the Complaint does not expressly state that 
Appellants are former Synapse customers, it – like 
Appellants’ briefing and representations at oral argument – 
implies as much.  So does the appellate record.  Indeed, with 
the exception of one of the named plaintiffs, Dynko, who was 
seemingly still a Synapse customer as of July 2008, the record 
reflects that none of the other named plaintiffs in this case 
were Synapse customers by that point.  (See App. at 964 
(Austin); 977 (Demetriou); 986 (Desai); 1005 (McNair).)  
Because the Complaint and Appellants’ ensuing class 
certification motion were filed over a year later, and in light 
of the Complaint’s failure to aver that Dynko received the 
Single Postcard that Synapse began using in 2009, see supra 
note 
  (See App. at 316 (alleging in the 
Complaint that “[e]ach of the named [p]laintiffs has standing 
to seek injunctive relief since they are likely to become 
magazine customers of Defendant in the future”).)  Unless 
5, the only conclusion we can logically reach is that the 
one named class member who (perhaps) was a Synapse 
customer in July 2008 terminated her Synapse service by the 
time the Complaint was filed in December 2009.  That, of 
course, occurred well before Appellants’ June 2010 motion 
for class certification.   
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they decide to subscribe again, then, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that they will be injured by those techniques in the 
future.  They do not allege that they intend to subscribe again.  
Instead, they say that they may, one day, become Synapse 
customers once more because “Synapse’s offers are 
compelling propositions as evidenced by [Appellants’] own 
acceptance of these offers (even on more than one occasion) 
… .”  (App. at 317.) 
 
Perhaps they may accept a Synapse offer in the future, 
but, speaking generally, the law accords people the dignity of 
assuming that they act rationally, in light of the information 
they possess.  Cf. Atl. Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds Int’l Corp., 
753 F. Supp. 505, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ contention that “defendants advanced money to [a] 
venture with the intention of driving it into the ground so that 
they could control the failed venture and then wait in line 
with other creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding” because that 
“view of the facts defies economic reason, and therefore does 
not yield a reasonable inference of fraudulent intent”); John 
N. Drobak, Cognitive Science, in The Elgar Companion to 
Law and Economics 453, 453 (Jürgen G. Backhaus ed., 2d ed. 
2005) (“Much of legal theory, like economics, assumes that 
people act rationally or at least can be induced to act 
rationally by the correct rules.”).  Whether they accept an 
offer or not will be their choice, and what that choice may be 
is a matter of pure speculation at this point.13
                                              
13 If Appellants’ suggestion is that they may not be 
able to help themselves when confronted with a really good 
subscription offer, they have still not provided a basis for 
standing.  Pleading a lack of self- restraint may elicit 
  Indeed, while 
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the injuries Appellants allegedly suffered when they were 
Synapse customers may suffice to confer individual standing 
for monetary relief,14 the wholly conjectural future injury 
Appellants rely on does not, and cannot, satisfy the 
constitutional requirement that a plaintiff seeking injunctive 
relief must demonstrate a likelihood of future harm.15
                                                                                                     
sympathy but it will not typically invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court.   
  See 
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109 (observing that the plaintiff “ha[d] a 
14 At least constitutional standing; we say nothing of 
statutory requirements that may or may not be met. 
15 Appellants also suggest, albeit obliquely, that they 
might be tricked into becoming Synapse customers again 
because Synapse does not prominently identify itself when 
making its magazine offers.  (See App. at 317 (“Synapse, if it 
identifies itself at all in these offers, does so in the fine-
print.”).)  However, Appellants are under no compulsion to 
uncritically accept magazine subscription offers.  Because 
Appellants are familiar with Synapse’s practices as well as 
the various names under which it operates, it is a speculative 
stretch to say they will unwittingly accept a Synapse offer in 
the future.  But even if they did, they would only be harmed if 
they were again misled by Synapse’s subscription renewal 
techniques, which would require them to ignore their past 
dealings with Synapse.  In short, Appellants ask us to 
presume they will be fooled again and again.  While we 
cannot definitively say they won’t get fooled again, it can 
hardly be said that Appellants face a likelihood of future 
injury when they might be fooled into inadvertently accepting 
a magazine subscription with Synapse and might be fooled by 
its renewal tactics once they accept that offer. 
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claim for damages … that appear[ed] to meet all Article III 
requirements” but that he nevertheless could not “meet[] the 
preconditions for asserting an injunctive claim in a federal 
forum”); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (11th Cir. 
1987) (noting, in rejecting class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2), that “a plaintiff who has standing to bring a 
damages claim does not automatically have standing to 
litigate a claim for injunctive relief arising out of the same set 
of operative facts” and that the plaintiff’s proposed injunctive 
relief class was inappropriate notwithstanding his “live claim 
for money damages”). 
 
Because Appellants have not established any 
reasonable likelihood of future injury in this case, they have 
no basis for seeking injunctive relief against Synapse.  See 
Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(customers who were subject to past discrimination by a gas 
station attendant lacked Article III standing to sue for 
prospective relief); Frankle v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 841, 848 (D. Minn. 2009) (explaining that a former 
customer had no “standing to seek an injunction … because 
she [was] no more likely than anyone else to be impacted”); 
Goldstein v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 
1348 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (former customer of the defendant’s 
who did not allege “that he plans in the future to purchase a 
Dryer from Defendant or that he plans in the future to have a 
Dryer installed by Defendant” lacked standing to pursue 
injunctive relief on behalf of a class of consumers who might 
be subjected to the allegedly illegal practice); Smith v. 
Chrysler Fin. Co., L.L.C., No. 00-cv-6003, 2004 WL 
3201002, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2004) (“The injury which 
Plaintiffs allege, that they may want to buy another Chrysler 
27 
 
in the future and may be discriminated against by Defendant, 
is simply too speculative … .”).   
 
Nor is Appellants’ position strengthened by the 
“capable of repetition yet evading review” doctrine.  They 
argue that they “should not be required to allow themselves to 
be continually billed … merely for standing purposes” since 
“the term of a subscription purveyed by Synapse is shorter 
than the course of a typical litigation.”  (App. at 317.)  But the 
inescapable fact is – as Appellants’ speculation about their 
future actions reflects – they cannot “make a reasonable 
showing that [they] will again be subjected to the alleged 
illegality.”  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109.  That means they cannot 
successfully invoke the “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” doctrine.  See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 
(1998) (stating the “capable of repetition yet evading review” 
doctrine applies in exceptional situations only and requires “a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] 
be subject to the same action again” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l 
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481 (1990))); Abdul-Akbar v. 
Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 207 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[C]onjecture as to 
the likelihood of repetition has no place in the application of 
this exceptional and narrow grant of judicial power.”).   
 
Appellants’ contention, moreover, is based on a false 
premise – namely, the alleged inequity in requiring them to 
maintain Synapse subscriptions throughout the duration of the 
class action litigation “merely for standing purposes.”  (App. 
at 317.)  In reality, standing is determined at the outset of the 
litigation, Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008), and 
Appellants would have been able to represent an injunctive 
relief class if they had maintained their subscriptions until 
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after moving for class certification,16 see Holmes v. Pension 
Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“So long as a class representative has a live claim at 
the time he moves for class certification, neither a pending 
motion nor a certified class action need be dismissed if his 
individual claim subsequently becomes moot.”).17
                                              
16 Moreover, it is not the case that the named plaintiffs’ 
standing to seek injunctive relief rises or falls solely with 
their status as Synapse customers.  Appellants only needed to 
demonstrate that  they were “likely to suffer future injury” 
from the Synapse’s conduct.  Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.  The 
best way to do that, of course, would have been to show they 
were Synapse customers, but that is not necessarily the only 
way.  The problem here is that Appellants provided no basis 
for their assertion of future harm. 
  In 
17 Although Appellants’ Complaint implies that 
Appellants were no longer Synapse customers by December 
2009, Appellants have not pleaded specific information 
concerning when they actually terminated their subscriptions 
with Synapse.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
Nor have they made any effort to establish that they faced a 
likelihood of future injury by Synapse at the time when their 
various complaints were filed.  Accordingly, we have treated 
the justiciability question presented as one of standing, 
although we recognize that Appellants’ Article III problem 
might sound in mootness if Appellants initially had standing 
to seek injunctive relief but lost it before moving for class 
certification.  See Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 (stating that “the 
standing inquiry [is] focused on whether the party invoking 
jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the 
suit was filed”); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 
49, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the plaintiff loses standing … 
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addition, notwithstanding that they may prefer injunctive 
relief as opposed to monetary relief now that a possible 
injunction is their only route to class certification, the notion 
that Appellants might have needed to maintain their 
subscriptions to pursue their claims (as opposed to a specific 
kind of relief) is misplaced, given that no one is contesting 
their effort to pursue their individual claims for damages.  See 
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109 (“Lyons’ claim that he was illegally 
strangled remains to be litigated in his suit for damages; in no 
sense does that claim ‘evade’ review.”). 
                                                                                                     
during the pendency of the proceedings …, the matter 
becomes moot, and the court loses jurisdiction.”).  However, 
because it is evident that none of the named plaintiffs were 
Synapse customers when the Complaint was filed and they 
did not seek or obtain class certification until after that, see 
supra note 12, the difference between “standing” and 
“mootness” is essentially a semantic one in this case, see 
Holmes, 213 F.3d at 135 (“So long as a class representative 
has a live claim at the time he moves for class certification, 
neither a pending motion nor a certified class action need be 
dismissed if his individual claim subsequently becomes 
moot.”).  Indeed, Appellants either lack standing because they 
were not Synapse customers at the time they filed the relevant 
complaint, or lost their standing for prospective relief when 
they ceased being Synapse customers before seeking class 
certification, which results in their “claims becom[ing] moot.”  
PeTA, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2002); see 
Holmes, 213 F.3d at 135-36 (“If … the putative class 
representative’s individual claim becomes moot before he 
moves for class certification, then any subsequent motion 
must be denied and the entire action dismissed.”). 
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Because Appellants lack Article III standing to seek 
injunctive relief, the District Court was obliged to deny class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2).    
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying class certification.18
                                              
18 Synapse argued before us that the District Court 
lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332(d) 
because Appellants’ averment that the value of the injunctive 
relief sought exceeded $5,000,000 is wholly speculative.  In 
light of our conclusion that Appellants lack Article III 
standing to seek injunctive relief, we decline to address that 
argument.  See generally Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) (recognizing that 
courts may “choose among threshold grounds for denying 
audience to a case on the merits” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Nor do we address, given the 
limited nature of our review, how the District Court should 
proceed on remand.  See Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1277-78 
(observing that, outside the “Rule 23(f) context, issues of 
standing are normally not available for review on 
interlocutory appeal”). 
 
